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AWAITING THE REBIRTH OF AN ICON: BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION
R . Lawrence Purdy†
Where have you gone, Justice Kennedy
Our nation turns its lonely eyes to you . . .
What’s that you say, Mrs. Robinson?
Justice K has left and gone away,
Hey hey hey, hey hey hey.1
Brown v. Board of Education:
These cases were decided on May 17, 1954.2 The opinions of that
date, declaring the fundamental principle that racial discrimination in
public education is unconstitutional, are incorporated herein by
reference. All provisions of federal, state, or local law requiring or
permitting such discrimination must yield to this principle.3

†
R. Lawrence Purdy received his B.S. from the United States Naval Academy
in 1968, and his J.D. from William Mitchell College of Law in 1977. He was part of
the pro bono trial and appellate team that represented the plaintiffs in the cases of
Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger. He dedicates this article to Linda Brown,
the elementary school student in Topeka, Kansas on whose behalf the historic case,
Brown v. Board of Education, was filed. Ms. Brown died on March 25, 2018, at the
age of 76.
1. SIMON & GARFUNKEL, Mrs. Robinson, on BOOKENDS (Columbia Records
1968). The lyrics of Paul Simon’s song, “Mrs. Robinson,” are dedicated to Associate
Justice Anthony Kennedy who, over the years since he first penned his powerful
dissent in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387–95 (2003), has gradually abandoned
long-held principles regarding “strict scrutiny review” of the use of suspect racial
classifications.
2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown I]. The
reference to “cases” refers to the fact that the United States Supreme Court agreed
to hear five separate cases presenting the same issue. The cases arose in Kansas
(Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas), South Carolina
(Briggs v. Elliott), Virginia (Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County,
Virginia), District of Columbia (Bolling v. Sharpe), and Delaware (Gebhart v. Belton).
See, e.g., Documents Related to Brown v. Board of Education, NATIONAL ARCHIVES,
https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/brown-v-board (last updated Aug. 15,
2016).
3. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955) (emphasis added)
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INTRODUCTION

The premise of this article is that the “fundamental principle,”4
set forth above and adopted over sixty years ago by the United States
Supreme Court, has effectively been overruled by two interrelated
twenty-first century decisions: (1) Grutter v. Bollinger5 in 2003, and (2)
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin6 in 2016. Following the Court’s

[hereinafter Brown II].
4. Yale Law Professor Stephen L. Carter has written that “most philosophers
still hold the view that a principle, in order to be a principle, must be applied
universally and impartially—that is, must actually be applied to all the cases that it
fits, with no exceptions for partisan considerations.” STEPHEN L. CARTER, (INTEGRITY)
48 (1996).
5. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
6. 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) [hereinafter Fisher II]. The Fisher case was first
argued before the Supreme Court in 2012. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S.
Ct. 2411 (2013) [hereinafter Fisher I]. In the Court’s initial 7–1 decision (Justice
Elena Kagan took no part in the consideration of the case), the Court vacated the
judgment of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (which had upheld UT’s
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decision in Grutter, the University of Texas at Austin (“UT”)
implemented a race-conscious admissions policy virtually
indistinguishable7 from the one used by the University of Michigan
Law School, the latter of which was upheld in Grutter.
The ultimate question posed throughout this article is whether
Brown’s fundamental principle, which was silently cast aside by the
Court in both Grutter and Fisher II, will be resurrected. This article
argues that it should be, and the sooner the better.8
race-conscious admissions policy) and remanded the case for further consideration.
Id. at 2414. On remand, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed (2–1) its previous decision
upholding UT’s Grutter-like policy. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633,
636 (5th Cir. 2014). Petitioner again appealed. The Supreme Court accepted review
and issued its second decision, Fisher II, on June 23, 2016. In a 4–3 decision, the
Court upheld UT’s Grutter-like policy. Playing a role in the outcome was the sudden
death of Justice Antonin Scalia. It is indisputable that Justice Scalia would have voted
to overturn Grutter and reverse the Fifth Circuit in Fisher II: “The Constitution
proscribes government discrimination on the basis of race, and state-provided
education is no exception.” Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)).
7. “UT’s race-conscious admissions procedures were modeled after the
program [Grutter] approved.” Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 217–
18 (5th Cir. 2011). In fact, UT’s counsel commenced his argument before the
Supreme Court on October 10, 2012, by stating that “[UT’s plan] is
indistinguishable [from Grutter] in terms of how it operates in taking race into
account.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2012) (No.
11-345). See generally R. Lawrence Purdy, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin: Grutter
(Not) Revisited, 79 MO. L. REV. 1, 2 n.7 (2014) [hereinafter Grutter (Not) Revisited]. See
generally R. Lawrence Purdy, Prelude: Bakke Revisited, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 313, 318–
28 (2003) [hereinafter Prelude] (discussing in full the policy at issue in Grutter).
8. Grutter ostensibly established a time limit of twenty-five years, after which
the alleged “compelling interest” approved would no longer be recognized. Grutter,
539 U.S. at 343. However, even though Justice Kennedy expressly recognized in
Fisher I that “strict scrutiny” analysis demanded that race-conscious admissions
policies be “limited in time,” 133 S. Ct. at 2421, Fisher II does not contain any time
limit on UT’s use of its race-conscious system. Nor does Fisher II mention Grutter’s
twenty-five-year deadline. The absence of any time limit in Fisher II suggests the
Court has no intention of enforcing this particular requirement. Moreover, Justice
Kennedy is guilty of misinterpreting Grutter when he stated that the Court in Grutter
“approved [the Law School’s] plan at issue upon concluding that it was . . . limited
in time.” Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2421. It was not. See Grutter (Not) Revisited, supra note
7, at 18–20 n.95 (“[The Law School has] indicated [it] will continue to use race as
a factor in admissions for as long as necessary to admit a critical mass of
underrepresented minority students, and no one can predict how long that might
be.” (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 851 (E.D. Mich. 2001)).
Similarly, during oral arguments in Fisher II, in direct response to a question from
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First, this article will describe the “compelling interest”
recognized in Grutter and Fisher II.9 Next, this article will analyze the
constitutional, statutory, and case law that preceded the outcomes in
Grutter and Fisher II.10 This article will then describe the declining use
of the fundamental principle established in Brown and offer
concluding remarks about the importance of remaining faithful to
Brown’s fundamental principle.11
II. THE “COMPELLING INTEREST” RECOGNIZED IN GRUTTER AND
FISHER II
In Grutter, the University of Michigan Law School asked the
Court to recognize, “in the context of higher education, a
compelling state interest in student body diversity”12 and “the
educational benefits that flow” therefrom.13 In response, a deeply
divided Court endorsed the “view that student body diversity is a
compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university
admissions.”14
But before a Court will approve the use of any governmentsanctioned race-conscious policy, it demands a showing of not only
a “compelling state interest” justifying the use of race,15 but one that
the Chief Justice as to when UT’s “program w[ould] be done,” UT’s counsel
responded: “[A]s soon as we can achieve the same sufficient numbers for the
educational benefits of diversity without taking race into account, we will no longer
take race into account.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198
(2015), https://www.c-span.org/video/transcript/?id=53769. Justice Kennedy
apparently demanded nothing more concrete from UT in terms of a time limit than
empty assurances. See, e.g., Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2210 (“Through regular evaluation
of data and consideration of student experience, the University must tailor its
approach in light of changing circumstances, ensuring that race plays no greater
role than is necessary to meet its compelling interest.”).
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Parts IV and V.
12. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
13. Id. at 307.
14. Id. at 325 (“In the wake of our fractured decision in Bakke, courts have
struggled to discern whether Justice Powell’s diversity rationale, set forth in part of
the opinion joined by no other Justice, is nonetheless binding precedent . . . .”).
The Grutter Court admittedly dodged answering this question. Id.
15. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326; Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504
(1989); Grutter, 539 U.S at 351–52 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“A majority of the Court has validated only two circumstances where ‘pressing
public necessity’ or a ‘compelling state interest’ can possibly justify racial
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can be subjected to strict judicial review.16 In addition, as Justice
O’Connor herself wrote in an earlier case (and repeated in Grutter),
“unless classifications based on race are ‘strictly reserved for remedial
settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and
lead to a politics of racial hostility.’”17 Her earlier words expressed
an important limiting principle regarding the exceedingly rare
judicially-permissible uses of race which, remarkably, she proceeded
to thoroughly ignore in Grutter.
What is important to understand is that the “compelling
interest” recognized by the Court in both Grutter and Fisher is not
“remedial” in any meaningful sense of the word. Justice O’Connor
conceded this point with an early apology in Grutter: “It is true that
some language in [our affirmative-action] opinions might be read to
suggest that remedying past discrimination is the only permissible
justification for race-based governmental action.”18 What is
undeniable is that neither the racially discriminatory policies
implemented by the University of Michigan19 nor their mirror image
discrimination by state actors. First . . . national security constitutes a ‘pressing
public necessity’ . . . . Second, the Court has recognized as a compelling state
interest a government’s effort to remedy past discrimination for which it is responsible.”
(emphasis added)). Justice Thomas then delineates the contours of what constitute
“pressing public necessity” and “compelling state interest” sufficient to justify the
use of racially discriminatory policies. Id. at 351–53. Both Justice O’Connor’s early
expression in Croson, and Justice Thomas’ views in Grutter, are fully consistent with
Justice Powell’s language in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke: “The State
certainly has a legitimate and substantial interest in ameliorating, or eliminating
where feasible, the disabling effects of identified discrimination.” 438 U.S. 265, 307
(1978) (emphasis added).
16. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[W]e hold
today that all racial classifications imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
government actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”).
And as Justice Powell previously held in Bakke, “Racial and ethnic distinctions of any
sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination.”
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291.
17. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added)).
18. Id. at 328 (emphasis added). Bluntly illustrating the non-remedial nature of
UT’s goal was the University’s argument that “the race-based component of its
admissions plan is needed to admit ‘[t]he African-American or Hispanic child of
successful professionals in Dallas.” Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2216. There is nothing
remotely “remedial” about a policy which has, as part of its goal, the enrollment of
affluent and educationally-privileged minority students. As Justice Alito noted,
“[a]ffirmative action programs were created to help disadvantaged students.” Id.
(emphasis in original).
19. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 312–17.
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at UT20 were adopted for the purpose of vindicating the legal rights
of a single person who had been injured by identifiable racial
discrimination.21 In fact, Justice O’Connor entirely ignored Justice
Powell’s view in Bakke that without a finding of identified
discrimination, “it cannot be said that the government has any
greater interest in helping one individual than in refraining from
harming another.”22 Justice Powell aptly concluded, “[t]his is a step
we have never approved.”23 Yet in Grutter, Justice O’Connor did
approve it, cavalierly casting aside yet another principle for an
entirely non-remedial purpose.24
One of the most difficult consequences presented by Grutter’s
detour around the explicit guarantee contained in the Equal
Protection Clause is this: if a non-remedial25 goal can be characterized
20. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2205–07.
21. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978). Justice
Powell explained this critical distinction in Bakke with his observation that the Court
has “never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as members of
relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the
absence of judicial, legislative, or administration findings of constitutional or statutory
violations.” Id. at 307 (emphasis added). Justice William Brennan, among the
dissenters in Bakke, seemed at least partially to agree: “[T]he central meaning of
today’s opinions [is that] government may take race into account . . . to remedy
disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice, at least when appropriate
findings have been made by judicial, legislative, or administrative bodies . . . .” Id. at
325. In other words, race may be used to ameliorate “disadvantages” that can be
connected to “identified discrimination.” Id. at 307; cf. id. at 326, n.1 (discussing that
the use of race to achieve an integrated student body is necessitated by the lingering
effects of past racial discrimination).
22. Id. at 309.
23. Id. at 310.
24. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). After conceding that “some
language” (i.e., her language) in prior Supreme Court cases suggested “that
remedying past discrimination is the only permissible justification for race-based
governmental action,” Justice O’Connor proceeded to excuse the Court’s elevation
of the Law School’s non-remedial “compelling” interest on the grounds that “we have
never held that the only governmental use of race that can survive strict scrutiny is
remedying past discrimination.” Id. She was half correct. Besides “remedying
[identified] past discrimination,” the only other use of race condoned by the Court
prior to Grutter had involved questions of national security. See id. at 351. Finally,
Justice O’Connor went on to state that the Court had not, since Bakke, “directly
addressed the use of race in the context of public higher education.” Id. at 328.
Justice O’Connor’s statement, while technically accurate, is frustratingly blind to the
Court’s decisions prior to Bakke, including Missouri ex rel. Gaines, Sipuel/Fisher, Sweatt,
and McLaurin. See infra Part III.C(1)–(3).
25. By way of a simple example, consider a government-sanctioned program
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as sufficiently compelling to justify the use of a racially discriminatory
policy to achieve it, and in the process cause harm to innocent third
parties (as the policies upheld in both Grutter and Fisher II undeniably
do), such an outcome essentially renders meaningless the
Fourteenth Amendment (constitutional)26 and Title VI (statutory)27
protections afforded every person, and, in the process, completely
undermines Brown’s fundamental principle.28
Regardless of whether a university’s goal of enrolling a racially
diverse class, as done by both the University of Michigan and UT
through the cleverly disguised use of the phrase “critical mass,”29 can
ever be realized,30 how can any future court meaningfully review a
that (even if presumptively created in good-faith) confiscates property owned by
one innocent citizen based on his or her race and distributes it to another citizen
based solely on his or her different race (and having nothing to do with any injury or
disadvantage inflicted on the latter by the government or by any identifiable
discriminatory conduct on the part of the former). Contrast that with an identical
program tied to vindicating a wrong demonstrably committed against the latter by
the former based on racial discrimination. The latter program would be remedial,
while the former would be non-remedial.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
27. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1964).
28. See Brown II, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“[S]egregation of children in public
schools solely on the basis of race . . . deprive[s] the children of the minority group
of equal educational opportunities . . . .”).
29. Perhaps nothing in Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Fisher II is
more incongruent with his dissent in Grutter than his reluctance to address UT’s
reliance on the term “critical mass,” an issue that was front and center in Fisher. See,
e.g., Official Transcript of Oral Argument in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin
(Oct. 10, 2012) at 70. See also R. Lawrence Purdy, The Critical Question Involves
“Critical Mass,” NAT’L ASS’N OF SCHOLARS (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.nas.org/arti
cles/the_critical_question_involves_critical_mass. In the end, however one wishes
to characterize it, “critical mass” is a number, below which “critical mass” has not been
achieved. Even the Dean of the University of Michigan Law School admitted to this
fact. See Prelude, supra note 7, at 375. Thus, any school that claims it must use race to
achieve “critical mass” is simply using race to achieve a certain “number” of students
based on their race. This is, or until Grutter was, plainly forbidden. See, e.g., Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329–30 (citing but ignoring Bakke’s
holding). For his part, Justice Kennedy’s obvious flip-flop on this issue in Fisher II
(where the phrase “critical mass” is barely mentioned) is simply unexplainable given
his agreement with Chief Justice Rehnquist in Grutter, that “beyond question . . . the
concept of critical mass is a delusion used by the Law School . . . to achieve
numerical goals indistinguishable from quotas.” Id. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
30. See, e.g., Jeremy Ashkenas, Haryoun Park & Adam Pearce, Even With
Affirmative Action, Blacks and Hispanics Are More Underrepresented at Top Colleges Than
35 Years Ago, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
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race-conscious admissions policy if it permits the phrase “critical
mass” to remain undefined? This is particularly true if the
purposefully vague term is given the degree of deference conferred
on universities in both Grutter and Fisher II.31 This gives rise to several
critical questions:
(1) If the educational benefit that allegedly flows from a
racially diverse student body32 truly represents a
“compelling” governmental interest,33 how could this
interactive/2017/08/24/us/affirmative-action.html; see also John Katzman & Steve
Cohen, Let’s Agree Racial Affirmative Action Failed, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26, 2017), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/lets-agree-racial-affirmative-action-failed1509058963?mod=d
jemMER.
31. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 389. Compare Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2420 (regarding
Justice Kennedy’s criticism in Fisher I of the Fifth Circuit’s degree of deference to
UT’s decisions regarding its race-conscious policy (“strict scrutiny . . . require[s] a
court to examine with care, and not defer to, a university’s ‘serious, good faith
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives’”)), with Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at
2214 (regarding the bended knee Justice Kennedy granted UT the second time
around (“Considerable deference is owed to a university in defining those intangible
characteristics, like student body diversity, that are central to its identity and
educational mission.” (emphasis added))). Justice Kennedy’s decision to affirm
UT’s policy becomes even more puzzling in light of his concluding statement in
Fisher II: “The Court’s affirmance of [UT’s] admission policy today does not necessarily
mean [UT] may rely on that same policy without refinement,” emphasizing UT’s “ongoing
obligation to engage in constant deliberation and continued reflection regarding
its admission policies.” Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2215 (emphasis added). Such imprecise
language seems entirely inconsistent with “strict scrutiny” analysis.
32. The evidence suggesting that racial diversity in a classroom provides actual,
much less measurable, “educational benefits” is illusory at best. See, e.g., LARRY
PURDY, GETTING UNDER THE SKIN OF “DIVERSITY”: SEARCHING FOR THE COLOR-BLIND
IDEAL 128 (2008) (discussing several studies and analyses conducted by both
proponents and opponents of race-conscious admissions systems, including a study
of Michigan University alumni which directly refutes the argument that “racial
diversity” is considered important to the educational experience); see also David A.
Lehrer, Colorblindness Succeeds in California, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/article_email/colorblindness-succeeds-in-california-1516566
501-lMyQjAxMTE4NjIzMjgyMDIyWj/; Prelude, supra note 7, at 342 n.144, 351–54
and accompanying footnotes, 378 n.308 (discussing, among others, the work of
professors Stephen Cole and the late Elinor Barber). Contra AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC.
& AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, DOES DIVERSITY MAKE A DIFFERENCE? (2000)
https://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/97003B7B-055F-4318-B14A-5336321FB 742/
0/DIVREP.PDF.
33. Cf. Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 343 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(discussing the pre-Bakke concept of a “compelling” interest that might justify a
resort to race-conscious policies). While racial discrimination may be justified in
certain extreme situations, “[m]ental ability is not in that category. All races can
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interest ever lose its “compelling” stature? The Court’s
holding in Fisher that this non-remedial interest is
sufficiently compelling to permit the use of racially
discriminatory admissions policies to achieve raises the
following deeply troubling questions:
(2) If the educational benefit of enrolling a racially diverse
student body truly is “compelling,” why do we continue to
provide public support for historically black colleges and
universities (HBCUs) that, by their very description, are
not racially diverse? The same question would apply to
some of our nation’s predominantly white public
universities.
(3) If a “critical mass” of students with a certain racial identity
is considered necessary in order to obtain concrete—and
presumably critically important—educational benefits, are
we to conclude that HBCUs and many predominantly
white public colleges and universities are, solely because of
their
racial
demographics,
inferior
educational
institutions?
(4) If such institutions are inferior, shouldn’t the government
require, as opposed to merely permit, every governmentsupported educational institution to adopt policies that
ensure the enrollment of a critical mass of minority
students, or in the case of HBCUs, a critical mass of white
students?
On a practical level, how does an admissions committee
establish who qualifies as a member of a particular racial group in
order to reap the benefits under a race-conscious system?34
compete fairly at all professional levels.” Id.
34. This dilemma, addressed by Justice Alito in his detailed dissent in Fisher II,
136 S. Ct. 2198, 2229–30 (2016), was directly faced by a former law school
admissions director at the University of Michigan who testified that black law
students objected to a black applicant being considered for the special admissions
program because “his mother was white.” Stillwagon Dep. 29, Nov. 6, 1998, Grutter
v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (on file with the author). By that
standard, our forty-fourth president, multi-racial Barack Obama, would not have
met the racial requirements being imposed by black students at the Law School. See
also Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2229 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“UT does not specify what it
means to be ‘African-American,’ ‘Hispanic,’ ‘Asian American,’ ‘Native American,’
or ‘White.’ And UT evidently labels each student as falling into only a single racial
or ethnic group.” (citation omitted)). Such questions raise bureaucratic horrors. See
Cleuci De Oliveira, Brazil’s New Problem With Blackness, FOREIGN POLICY MAGAZINE
(Apr. 5, 2017), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/05/brazils-new-problem-withblackness-affirmative-action (“As [Brazil] grapples with its legacy of slavery,
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Of course, none of these questions would arise if the Court in
Grutter had remained faithful to Brown’s fundamental principle.35
And had the Court done so, Fisher likely never would have arisen. Yet
these are the very sorts of vexing and deeply divisive questions which
are now presented because of Grutter’s regrettable deviation from
Brown’s bedrock principle.
This brings us full circle back to the decision reached by a
unanimous Court in a series of landmark rulings in 1954 and 1955.36
Brown was clear and unambiguous in its language and intent. With
the exception of the steps necessary “to effectuate a transition to a
racially nondiscriminatory school system,”37 the Court made clear
that it would brook no excuse for, nor condone, further racial
discrimination, particularly that which would hinder “admission to
the public schools on a nonracial basis.”38
Notwithstanding this clarity, and the absence of any Supreme
Court decision announcing its nullification, the hypothesis of this
article is that even if not explicitly overruled, Brown’s fundamental
principle has effectively been rejected by the Court’s deeply divided
opinions in Grutter (2003)39 and Fisher II (2016).40 Thus, unless and
until there is an express recommitment to that principle in a future
case, Brown’s landmark status may be relegated to little more than a
temporary footnote in our Nation’s complex racial past.
Two final important introductory comments deserve mention.
First, the argument for strictly adhering to Brown’s fundamental
principle is not about ignoring our Nation’s past. Indeed, it is the
opposite. Brown should always stand as a reminder of our past; but
affirmative-action race tribunals are measuring skull shape and nose widths to
determine who counts as disadvantaged.”).
35. Although he did not cite to Brown, Justice Scalia wrote that the Court in
Grutter should have reached “a clear constitutional holding that racial preferences
in state educational institutions are impermissible. . . . The Constitution proscribes
government discrimination on the basis of race, and state-provided education is no
exception.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 348–49 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). His words are a perfect reflection of Brown’s fundamental principle. For
his part, Justice Clarence Thomas penned a lengthy and majestic dissent in Grutter,
and an equally compelling opinion in Fisher I (concurring in the judgment). Both
paid full homage to Brown. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349; Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2422
(2013). Justice Thomas’ opinions deserve to be read in their entirety.
36. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
37. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301.
38. Id. at 300–301.
39. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
40. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198.
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similarly, it should be recognized as perhaps the single most
important step our Nation has taken in terms of overcoming racial
oppression and promoting racial equality. To the extent progress has
occurred in that regard—and it is undeniable that progress has
occurred—these achievements are in no small measure directly
attributable to Brown. To suggest otherwise is to cast a blind eye to
Brown’s enormous impact since its landmark decision was
announced.
Second, the argument for returning to Brown’s fundamental
principle is not one that is opposed to “affirmative action” policies.
Though largely unknown, President John F. Kennedy originally
coined the phrase “affirmative action” in an executive order signed
within months following his inauguration.41 In it, President Kennedy
called for federal government contractors to take “affirmative
action” to ensure no person was denied employment based on her
or his skin color.42 It was President Kennedy’s unambiguous directive
that race be removed rather than added as a factor in government
employment.43 To be clear, a return to Brown’s fundamental
principle is perfectly consistent with “affirmative action” policies (as
defined by President Kennedy) which, in the author’s view, should
be maintained in perpetuity.
III. HOW WE GOT HERE
Analyzing the continued relevance of Brown’s fundamental
principle is not difficult. One begins by juxtaposing Brown’s
language with language from two additional primary sources: (1)
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution,44 and (2) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.45 This section first discusses these sources and then addresses
several important Supreme Court cases dealing with race and
education, with a specific focus on the conflicting positions taken by
Justice Kennedy when it comes to assessing the constitutionality of
race-conscious college admissions systems. Justice Kennedy, a
41. Exec. Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. R. 1977 (Mar. 6, 1961).
42. Id. (“[D]iscrimination because of race . . . is contrary to the Constitutional
principles and policies of the United States; . . . The contractor will take affirmative
action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during
employment, without regard to their race, creed, color or national origin.”).
43. Id.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
45. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1964).
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vigorous dissenter when the Court narrowly upheld the University of
Michigan’s heavily race-conscious system in Grutter, switched sides in
Fisher II when he wrote approvingly of UT’s Grutter-like policy.
A.

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause

As the oldest of these sources, the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution reads, in pertinent part: “No State shall . . . deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”46
Though not explicit, there is an undeniable symmetry between the
“Equal Protection Clause” of the Fourteenth Amendment and
Brown’s fundamental principle. While the ratification of this
Amendment in 1868 did not end government-sanctioned racial
discrimination (which tragically persisted in the context of public
school education for several generations after its adoption),47 the
plain meaning of its language eventually took root.48 What cannot
be denied is that when the Equal Protection Clause is read in concert
with, and in the full context of, our Nation’s history involving race,
there is near perfect harmony between the Fourteenth Amendment
and both the language and the principle asserted in Brown: the
prohibition against government-sanctioned racial discrimination.49
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
47. Over two decades after Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), its pernicious
“separate but equal” doctrine was unanimously upheld in the context of public
education in Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927). In a unanimous decision
authored by Chief Justice William Howard Taft, Jr., joined by several justices
considered luminaries on the Court (including Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Louis
Brandeis, and Harlan F. Stone), the Court tragically upheld the State of Mississippi’s
decision to classify a nine-year-old Chinese-American schoolgirl as “colored” and
thereby deny her the right, not to mention the rights of all “colored” children in
Mississippi, to attend a school for white children. Id.
48. One of the most eloquent discussions of the symmetry between the Equal
Protection Clause and Brown’s fundamental principle is found in Justice John
Marshall Harlan’s memorable dissent in Plessy. 163 U.S. at 559. While Plessy did not
deal directly with education, Plessy’s establishment of the horribly mislabeled
“separate but equal” doctrine directly affected public education in large parts of the
Nation for decades until it was expressly overruled by Brown. Id. Justice Harlan’s
dissent in Plessy is virtually indistinguishable from the principle announced in Brown
almost sixty years later, as Justice Harlan wrote: “Our constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all
citizens are equal before the law . . . . The law regards man as man, and takes no
account of his . . . color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of
the land are involved.” Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
49. Buttressed by its finding that racially segregated educational facilities were
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Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

In addition to the Fourteenth Amendment, there is an even
more perfect harmony between the language of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and Brown’s fundamental principle. This
landmark federal statute reads: ”No person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be . . .
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.”50
Justice Powell, in Bakke, described “[t]he language of [Title VI],
like that of the Equal Protection Clause, [a]s majestic in its sweep.”51
Given its clear wording and the principle it unquestionably advances,
it is inconceivable how any flagship public university and, in
particular, large and notable state institutions such as the University
of Michigan and UT (the defendants in Grutter and Fisher,
respectively), can openly engage in racially discriminatory
admissions practices and, at the same time, remain in compliance
with the language of this statute. Nothing in it remotely hints that its
prohibitory language may be nullified in the interest of achieving a
vague and, most importantly, non-remedial goal, to wit: achieving the
purported educational benefits of “diversity.”
The symmetry between the Fourteenth Amendment, Brown,
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act remained largely intact until,
almost as an afterthought, it was naively and needlessly cracked by
Justice Powell’s “diversity” dicta in the Court’s 1978 decision in
Bakke.52 That symmetry was fully shattered in the Court’s 2003 ruling
in Grutter where Justice O’Connor explicitly sanctioned the
reintroduction of racially discriminatory admissions policies in the
context of public school admissions for, as emphasized throughout
this article, a non-remedial purpose.53
Despite a brief hiatus in 2013 following Fisher I,54 Justice
O’Connor’s rationale in Grutter was disappointingly reaffirmed by
“inherently unequal,” the Court in Brown held that “the plaintiffs and others
similarly situated . . . [were] deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2006).
51. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284 (1978) (emphasis
added).
52. Id. See generally Prelude, supra note 7, at 359 (discussing in full the decision
in Bakke).
53. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
54. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411. See generally Grutter (Not) Revisited, supra note 7
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the narrowest of margins in Fisher II.55 Even more disconcerting is
the fact that Grutter’s detour from Brown’s fundamental principle
ended up being endorsed by Justice Kennedy, one of the four
justices who, after writing in vigorous opposition in Grutter, wrote
thirteen years later in Fisher II to uphold a virtually identical policy.56
C.

Other Supreme Court Cases

To understand the importance of the undiluted principle
announced in Brown, it is helpful to briefly examine pre- and postBrown Supreme Court cases which led to, or closely aligned with, the
Court’s eventual decree in Brown. The cases that follow focused
directly on race and the role it played in admissions to public
educational institutions with an emphasis on institutions of higher
learning.57
1.

Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada58

Lloyd Gaines was refused admission to the University of
Missouri School of Law because, as explained by the Court, “it was
contrary to the constitution, laws and public policy of the State to
admit a negro as a student [to] the University of Missouri.”59 Gaines
challenged the University’s refusal to admit him on the grounds that
it “constituted a denial by the State of the equal protection of the
laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”60 Even though the
state provided funds that would have allowed the petitioner to attend
law school in one of the neighboring states that admitted
nonresident negroes,61 the Supreme Court held that “a privilege
[that] has been created for white law students . . . is [being] denied
to negroes by reason of their race.”62 The Court made clear that had
(discussing in full the decision in Fisher I).
55. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
56. Compare Grutter 539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), with Fisher II, 136
S. Ct. 2198 (2013) (Kennedy, J., authoring the majority opinion).
57. One important exception is the 2007 decision in Parents Involved In
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); see infra Part
II.C.8 (discussing public education at both the high school (Seattle, Washington)
and elementary school levels (Jefferson County, Louisville, Kentucky)).
58. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
59. Id. at 343.
60. Id. at 342.
61. Id. at 348–49.
62. Id. at 349.
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Missouri, consistent with the still-prevailing “separate but equal
doctrine” of Plessy v. Ferguson, provided Gaines facilities for legal
education substantially equal to those which the state provided for
white students, it might have denied Gaines’ challenge.63 However,
because Missouri had no law school available for black citizens, the
Court held that Gaines “was entitled to be admitted to the law school
of the State University.”64 Although the Court did nothing to reverse
the notion that the availability of “separate but equal” facilities likely
would have defeated Gaines’ challenge, the holding was nevertheless
a step towards the inevitable adoption of Brown’s fundamental
principle.
2.

Sipuel v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma65

In January 1946, Ada Lois Sipuel (Fisher) applied to the
University of Oklahoma School of Law, the only institution for legal
education then supported and maintained by Oklahoma.66
According to the facts, Sipuel’s “application for admission was
denied solely because of her color.”67 Sipuel brought a writ of
mandamus seeking her admission, which was denied by Oklahoma’s
lower courts.68 Citing its earlier ruling in Missouri ex rel. Gaines, the
Supreme Court held that “[t]he State must provide [legal
education] for her in conformity with the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”69 Like Missouri ex rel. Gaines before
her, Sipuel’s eventual success did not result in the reversal of Plessy’s
“separate but equal” doctrine, but it, too, represented a step forward
towards the eventual adoption of Brown’s fundamental principle.

63. Id. at 352.
64. Id.
65. 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
66. Id. at 632.
67. Id.
68. See Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 180 P.2d 135, 136 (Okla.
1947).
69. Sipuel, 332 U.S. at 632 (citing Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S.
337 (1938)). After additional court challenges by Oklahoma, Sipuel eventually was
admitted and graduated from the University of Oklahoma’s School of Law in August
1952. See Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U.S. 147 (1948). Her story is one of amazing grace and
resilience in the face of the many frustrating legal setbacks she faced based on
Plessy’s then-still-applicable “separate but equal” doctrine. See Fisher, Ada Lois Sipuel
(1924–1995) OKLAHOMA HISTORICAL SOCIETY, http://www.okhistory.org/
publications/enc/entry.php?entry=FI009 (last visited March 20, 2018).
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Sweatt v. Painter70 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents71

These cases involving the University of Texas Law School and
the Graduate School of the University of Oklahoma, respectively,
were decided the same day, June 5, 1950.72 Heman Sweatt and
George McLaurin were denied admission to their respective state
universities solely because they were black.73 At the time, both Texas
and Oklahoma maintained segregated public schools in accordance
with Plessy’s “separate but equal” doctrine.74 After noting that Sweatt,
McLaurin, Missouri ex rel. Gaines, and Sipuel/Fisher were “the only cases
in this Court which present the issue of the constitutional validity of
race distinctions in state-supported graduate and professional
education,” the Court ordered the admission of both petitioners.75
Sweatt and McLaurin were the last two cases decided by the Court
before Brown squarely presented the issue of whether race had any
legitimate role to play in the field of public school admissions.
4.

Brown v. Board of Education

In each of the cases argued as part of Brown,76 “minors of the
Negro race . . . [were] denied admission to schools attended by white
children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according
to race.”77 The common legal question was whether this segregation

70. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
71. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
72. See McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 638; Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 631.
73. See McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 638; Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 631.
74. The Court in Sweatt stated that it could not “find substantial equality in the
educational opportunities offered white and Negro law students by the State [of
Texas].” 339 U.S. at 633. In so holding, the Court skirted the issue of whether Plessy
remained good law. Similarly, in McLaurin, the Court dealt with the issue of the
university’s “different [i.e., unequal] treatment from other students solely because
of his race.” 339 U.S. at 638 (including separation in the classroom, library, and
cafeteria seating). The Court held that “the Fourteenth Amendment preclude[d]
differences in treatment by the state based upon race.” Id. at 642. Thus, with Plessy
holding on by a thread, the Nation was brought two steps closer to Brown’s eventual
adoption of the fundamental principle that “racial discrimination in public
education is unconstitutional.” Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955).
75. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 635.
76. See supra note 2 for a list of these cases.
77. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 487 (1954).
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based on race “deprived the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the
laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.”78
In its succinct opinion in Brown I (1954), the Court made clear
that “[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal” and
did, in fact, deprive plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.79 And a year later in
Brown II (1955), the Court unanimously reaffirmed that, from that
point forward, the disparate treatment of students based on race was
a violation of their individual and personal rights guaranteed by the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.80
Following Brown, and excluding cases where race-conscious
practices were upheld to remedy the racial segregation in school
districts previously segregated by law,81 the question of raceconscious admissions policies arose in only two cases prior to Grutter
in 2003.82 For nearly the next quarter of a century, no Supreme
Court case following Brown, and unrelated to the efforts to remedy
pre-Brown school segregation, addressed the use of race-conscious
admissions in public education. However, in the interim between
Brown and Bakke, other important public pronouncements and
landmark federal civil rights legislation mirrored Brown’s
fundamental principle. The public pronouncements emanated from
such diverse voices as President John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. Both President Kennedy’s 1961 executive order83
and the stirring words delivered in 1963 by the churchman and
American civil rights hero, Dr. King, directly addressed the need to
end racial discrimination throughout the public sphere.84
78. Id.
79. Id. at 495.
80. See Brown II, 349 U.S. at 298. This undiluted principle was utterly ignored
by Justice O’Connor in Grutter and by Justice Kennedy in Fisher II.
81. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Davis v. Bd. of Sch.
Comm’rs of Mobile Cty., 402 U.S. 33 (1971); Green v. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty.,
391 U.S. 430 (1968).
82. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
83. See Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Mar. 6, 1961) (“Establishing
the President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity”).
84. Martin Luther King, Reverend, Public Speech at the Lincoln Memorial in
Washington D.C.: “I Have A Dream . . . .” (Aug. 28, 1963) (“I have a dream that my
four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the
color of their skin but by the content of their character.”); CORRETTA SCOTT KING
(ed.), THE WORDS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 95 (1983).
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DeFunis v. Odegaard85

In a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed on technical
grounds86 petitioner Marco DeFunis Jr.’s claim that the University of
Washington Law School discriminated against him on account of his
race,87 in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Among the
justices dissenting from the Court’s dismissal on grounds of
mootness was Justice William O. Douglas, who wrote at length about
the law school’s “minority admissions program.”88 This program
encompassed only those applicants who voluntarily indicated on
their application “that their dominant ethnic origin was either black,
Chicano, American Indian, or Filipino.”89
Justice Douglas directly addressed several important issues
including whether the non-fixed percentage of minority applicants
the law school sought to enroll constituted an impermissible quota.90
With regard to the general applicability of the Equal Protection
Clause in the context of DeFunis’ claim, Justice Douglas observed
that “[t]he clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
85. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
86. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 350 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting by the time
petitioner’s claim reached the Supreme Court, DeFunis was set to graduate and,
thus, the Court determined his claim was moot). A surprising coalition of the
Court’s most liberal justices dissented from the Court’s action. As Justice William
Brennan presciently wrote (joined by Justices William O. Douglas, Byron White, and
Thurgood Marshall), “[I]n endeavoring to dispose of this case as moot, the Court
clearly disserves the public interest. The constitutional issues which are avoided
today concern vast numbers of . . . colleges and universities . . . . Few constitutional
questions in recent history have stirred as much debate, and they will not disappear.”
Id. at 350 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 337 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating petitioner is described as white).
88. Id. at 331 (noting the law school conceded, “by its own assessment—taking
all factors into account—it admitted minority applicants who would have been
rejected had they been white”); see also Prelude, supra note 7, at 315 (finding identical
admission was made by the dean of the University of Michigan’s Law School).
89. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 320 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
90. See id. at 333 (noting Justice Douglas’ observation, “[w]ithout becoming
embroiled in a semantic debate over whether this practice constitutes a ‘quota,’ it is
clear that, given the limitation on the total number of applicants who could be
accepted, this policy did reduce the total number of places for which DeFunis could
compete—solely on account of his race”). Compare id. at 332–33 (explaining that
Justice Douglas’ treatment of the proportion of minority students admitted is in
sharp contrast to the position taken by Justice O’Connor in Grutter because the
school determined 15% to 20% of the entering class to be reasonable), with Grutter,
539 U.S. at 342–43. The identical situation exists under the policies upheld in Grutter
and Fisher II.
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was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial
discrimination in the States,”91 and that “[t]he consideration of race
as a measure of an applicant’s qualification normally introduces a
capricious and irrelevant factor working an invidious
discrimination.”92
Interestingly, four years before Justice Powell’s lone recitation
of his “diversity” rationale in Bakke,93 and Justice Powell’s naïve and
ill-informed praise for a subtly anti-Semitic admissions policy
adopted by Harvard University,94 Justice Douglas offered his own
thoughts on changes to the University of Oregon Law School’s
admissions program.95 Justice Douglas envisioned that these changes
might offer the potential to achieve racial and ethnic diversity in “a
racially neutral way.”96
Also of interest was Justice Douglas’ lack of concern over the law
school’s separate classification of minority applicants based on his
belief that the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) likely posed an
unfair “cultural” obstacle to some of these applicants.97 His objection
91. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 334 (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967)).
92. Id. at 333 (citations omitted).
93. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
94. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317–18. See Alan M. Dershowitz & Laura Hanft, Affirmative
Action and the Harvard College Diversity-Discretion Model: Paradigm or Pretext? 1 CARDOZO
L. REV. 379, 385 (1979) (“Mr. Justice Powell legitimated an admissions process that
is inherently capable of gross abuse and that . . . has in fact been deliberately
manipulated for the specific purpose of perpetuating religious and ethnic
discrimination in college admissions”); Antonin Scalia, The Disease As Cure: In Order
to Get Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race, 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 147, 148
(1979) (“[T]he Harvard College ‘diversity admissions’ program, which Mr. Justice
Powell’s opinion so generously praises, was designed to reduce as inconspicuously
as possible the disproportionate number of New York Jewish students that a merit
admissions system had produced.”).
95. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 320–48. The University of Oregon Law School’s policy
heavily relied, as most law schools still do today, on an applicant’s LSAT score and
undergraduate GPA. See id. at 340–41 (describing Justice Douglas’ concept of a raceneutral policy).
96. Id. at 334. Justice Douglas suggested an approach where “the committee
would be making decisions on the basis of individual attributes, rather than
according a preference solely on the basis of race.” Id. at 331–32. He also observed
that “[t]he key to the problem is the consideration of each application in a racially
neutral way.” Id. at 334.
97. Id. at 335. Justice Douglas recommended that “[a]bolition of the LSAT
would be a start.” Id. at 340. Justice Alito later noted in Fisher II that “[a]
pproximately 850 4-year-degree institutions do not require the SAT or ACT as part
of the admissions process.” 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2234 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting).
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to the potentially unfair use of the LSAT, however, did not convert
to his approval of using race as a factor in admissions. He concluded
that “[w]hatever his race, [DeFunis] had a constitutional right to
have his application considered on its individual merits in a racially
neutral manner.”98
Notably, Justice Douglas referenced Brown99 in discussing the
harms that considering race can create, including a “stamp of
inferiority” that may unfairly attach to the beneficiaries of racepreference programs.100 He commenced with the observation that
“[t]he Equal Protection Clause commands the elimination of racial
barriers, not their creation in order to satisfy our theory as to how
society ought to be organized.”101 He continued, “A segregated
admissions process creates suggestions of stigma and caste no less
than a segregated classroom, and, in the end, it may produce that
result despite its contrary intentions.”102
Justice Douglas also offered a prescient but unheeded warning
that arguably should have deterred both Justice Powell (in Bakke)
and Justice O’Connor (in Grutter) from their adoption of “diversity”
as a “compelling” state interest. He wrote:
If discrimination based on race is constitutionally
permissible when those who hold the reins can come up
with “compelling” reasons to justify it, then constitutional
guarantees acquire an accordion-like quality. . . . All races
can compete fairly at all professional levels. So far as race is
concerned, any state-sponsored preference to one race

98. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 337 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 342–43 (referencing Brown I as being “at the heart of all our school
desegregation cases”).
100. Id. at 343.
101. Id. at 342.
102. Id. at 343. Many academic leaders, including proponents for race-conscious
admissions policies, have acknowledged similar concerns. See, e.g., WILLIAM G.
BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF
CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 264–65 (1998) (“The
very existence of a process that gives explicit consideration to race can raise
questions about the true abilities of even the most talented minority students
(‘stigmatize’ them, some would say) . . . . More than a few black students
unquestionably suffer some degree of discomfort from being beneficiaries of the
admissions process.”). Bowen and Bok fully concede “these costs . . . are all too real.”
Id.
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over another in that competition is in my view “invidious”
and violative of the Equal Protection Clause.103
Justice Douglas’ views were fully consistent with Brown’s
fundamental principle.
Four years later, the landmark decision in Bakke was issued.104
As is apparent from a close reading, nothing in the Court’s eventual
judgment—apart from Justice Powell’s lone dicta regarding the
“diversity”
rationale105—contravened
Brown’s
fundamental
principle.
6.

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke106

Allan Bakke brought suit against the University of CaliforniaDavis Medical School, claiming it violated his rights under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 by denying him admission.107 At the time,
the school maintained a special admissions program that set aside a
specific number of seats in the entering class for certain minority
applicants.108 The Superior Court of California sustained his
challenge and enjoined UC-Davis from considering his race or the
race of any other applicant in making admissions decisions.109
However, it refused to order Bakke’s admission to the medical
school, holding that he had not carried his burden of proving that
he would have been admitted but for the constitutional and statutory
violations.110 The Supreme Court of California affirmed the superior
court holding, but modified the trial court’s judgment by directing
UC-Davis to admit him.111 The Supreme Court affirmed Bakke’s
personal victory in a deeply divided 5-4 ruling that produced “many
opinions, no single one speaking for the Court.”112
Justice William Brennan viewed the issue presented in Bakke as
“[w]hether government may use race-conscious programs to redress
103. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 343–44 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
104. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978).
105. Id. at 322–23.
106. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
107. Id. at 277–79.
108. Id. at 274.
109. Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34 (Cal. 1976).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 64 (describing the holding at the California Supreme Court).
112. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324–25 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting
in part).
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the continuing effects of past discrimination.”113 Justice Powell, who
wrote the opinion for the Court, rejected this proposition.114 He
viewed remedying “the effects of ‘societal discrimination’ [as] an
amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the
past.”115 Nevertheless, Bakke was an important and controlling
precedent for a number of reasons, most notably Justice Powell’s—
and the Court’s—rejection of Justice Brennan’s view.116 As Justice
Powell went on to explain in great detail:
We have never approved a classification that aids persons
perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the
expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of
judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of
constitutional or statutory violations. . . . Without such
findings . . . it cannot be said that the government has any greater
interest in helping one individual than in refraining from
harming another. Thus, the government has no compelling
justification for inflicting such harm.117
Of course, it is precisely this sort of harm to “innocent
individuals” that routinely occurs under the racially discriminatory
admissions systems upheld in Grutter and Fisher II.
What unmistakably was not a part of Bakke, except in the mind
of Justice Powell alone, was his reference to the “diversity”
rationale.118 No other justice joined the portion of Justice Powell’s
opinion that referenced the attainment of “a diverse student body”

113. Id.
114. Id. at 310–11. The Court’s majority also rejected other claimed purposes
for UC-Davis’ race-conscious program, including improvement of health-care
services to underserved communities and “the attainment of a diverse student
body.” Id.
115. Id. at 307.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 307–309 (emphasis added). In Grutter, Justice O’Connor
acknowledged Justice Powell’s rejection of “an interest in remedying societal
discrimination because such measures would risk placing unnecessary burdens on
innocent third parties ‘who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the
beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to have suffered.’”
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323–24 (2003). Unfortunately, it was a principle
she utterly ignored in reaching her decision in Grutter, abandoned for a purpose
having nothing to do with a showing of any, much less identified, discrimination on
the part of the defendant Law School. Id. See generally Prelude, supra note 7
(comparing Grutter and Bakke).
118. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311–12.
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as a “constitutionally permissible goal.”119 There was, however,
surprising agreement between Justices Powell and Brennan when it
came to using race to advance a state’s “legitimate and substantial
interest in ameliorating, or eliminating . . . the disabling effects of
identified discrimination.”120 Justice Powell cited the obvious example
of “the line of school desegregation cases, commencing with
Brown . . . .”121
In Bakke, Justice Powell paid homage to the symmetry between
the Fourteenth Amendment, Brown, and Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, a symmetry that is omnipresent throughout his lengthy
opinion. However, Justice Powell’s and the Court’s focus was clearly
on the Fourteenth Amendment—there may be no better, more
detailed discussion of it than his dissertation in Bakke:
The guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to
all persons.122 Its language is explicit: “No State shall . . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” . . . The guarantee of equal
protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one
individual and something else when applied to a person of
another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then
it is not equal. . . . The guarantees of equal protection . . .
“are universal in their application . . . without regard to any
differences of race, of color, . . . and the equal protection of the
laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.” Indeed, it
is not unlikely that among the Framers were many who
would have applauded a reading of the Equal Protection
Clause that states a principle of universal application and is
responsive to the racial, ethnic, and cultural diversity of the
Nation.123
Justice Powell also cited Yale Law School Professor Alexander
Bickel: “The lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and
the lesson of contemporary history have been the same for at least a
119. Id.
120. Id. at 307 (emphasis added).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 289. “[D]ecisions based on race . . . by faculties and administrations
of state universities are reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 287
(citing McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950)); Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
123. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289–93 (emphasis added) (citing, among others,
Alexander Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 60–63 (1955)).
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generation: discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral,
unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic society.”124
When read in its entirety, Justice Powell’s decision affirming the
judgment in favor of Bakke (notwithstanding his lone detour into
the diversity rationale) was as powerfully consistent with Brown’s
fundamental principle as any decision ever written.125 It is therefore
not difficult to conclude from his condemnation of using race to
harm innocent individuals (and without demonstrating a need to
remedy an injury due to identified acts of discrimination),126 that
Justice Powell would have strongly condemned the heavy role race
has come to play in the admissions policies127 approved on the basis
of his dicta in Bakke.128

124. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295, n.35 (emphasis added) (citing ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT, 133 (Yale University Press 1975)). Alexander
Bickel was an active participant in Brown as a law clerk for the late Justice
Frankfurter. See Alexander M. Bickel Dies; Constitutional Law Expert, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
8, 1974), https://www.nytimes.com/1974/11/08/archives/alexander-m-bickeldies-constitutional-law-expert-a-legal.html.
125. See Prelude, supra note 7, at 359–67 (discussing in detail Justice Powell’s
opinion).
126. In language that seems to directly contradict the use of race to achieve a
non-remedial interest like that eventually approved in Grutter, Justice Powell wrote:
“By hitching the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause to . . . transitory
considerations, we would be holding, as a constitutional principle, that judicial
scrutiny of classifications touching on racial and ethnic background may vary with
the ebb and flow of political forces.” Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298. He goes on to note that
“[d]isparate constitutional tolerance of such classifications well may serve to
exacerbate racial and ethnic antagonisms rather than alleviate them.” Id. at 298–99.
127. Compare Prelude, supra note 7, at 371–74 (discussing Justice Powell’s view of
the so-called “Harvard Plan” which he suggested might be the sort of plan he would
adjudge constitutional), with Bakke, 438 U.S. at 378 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (stating Justice Brennan found no constitutional
significance between the UC-Davis “quota” and the so-called Harvard Plan: “For
purposes of constitutional adjudication, there is no difference between the two
approaches.”).
128. One question never answered by Justice Powell, Justice O’Connor, or
Justice Kennedy is this: how can the element of race ever be “weighed fairly and
competitively” while at the same time preserving an applicant’s “right to
individualized consideration without regard to . . . race” other than for the sole
purpose of achieving a number (be it one, ten, one hundred, or a “critical mass”)
of enrollees based solely on skin color? Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318 n.52. The latter, of
course, is forbidden by the Constitution. Id. at 307 (“Preferring members of any one
group for no reason other than race . . . is discrimination for its own sake. This the
Constitution forbids.” (citing Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954))).
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Indeed, for all his idealistic expressions and expectations,
Justice Powell provides the answer for why the diversity rationale
simply cannot work. And in the process, he perfectly describes what
has happened because of the decisions in Grutter and Fisher II: “To
hold otherwise would be to convert a remedy heretofore reserved for
violations of legal rights into a privilege that all institutions throughout
the Nation could grant at their pleasure to whatever groups are
perceived as victims of societal discrimination. This is a step we have
never approved.”129
7.

Grutter v. Bollinger130

Justice Sandra Day O’Connor began her fateful detour from
Brown’s fundamental principle by observing that the University of
Michigan Law School’s race-conscious admissions policy was
intended to “compl[y] with [Bakke] on the use of race in university
admissions.”131 However, Justice O’Connor conceded, as she must,
that “Justice Powell’s diversity rationale [was] set forth in part of the
[Bakke] opinion [that was] joined by no other justice.”132 It most
certainly was not the ruling of the Court in Bakke, or of any court
before it. As a consequence, the Court in Grutter essentially ignored
the question of whether Justice Powell’s opinion was binding

129. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310 (emphasis added).
130. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
131. Id. at 314 (referring to Justice Powell’s “diversity rationale”). It is ironic that
the University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions program was ruled
unconstitutional in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), on the same day Grutter
was issued, and emanated from the same university the Grutter court presumed to
be acting in “good faith.” See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318–
19). Compare the caveat that Justice Powell set out in Bakke, which was not cited by
Justice O’Connor: “[A] court would not assume that a university, professing to
employ a facially nondiscriminatory admissions policy, would operate it as a cover for
the functional equivalent of a quota system.” Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318 (emphasis added).
In fact, however, that is precisely how the law school’s admissions policy functioned.
Justice Powell also provided an accurate description of what eventually became the
law school’s (and UT’s) policy: “No matter how strong their qualifications,
quantitative and extracurricular, including their own potential for contribution to
educational diversity, [white and Asian-American applicants, among others] are
never afforded the chance to compete with applicants from the preferred
[underrepresented minority] groups for the . . . seats [reserved to achieve a critical
mass of students from the latter groups]. At the same time, the preferred applicants
have the opportunity to compete for every seat in the class.” See id. at 319–20.
132. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 (emphasis added).
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precedent.133 Instead, for the first time in our Nation’s jurisprudence
since announcing Brown’s fundamental principle, the Court
anointed a non-remedial purpose134 as a compelling state interest that
can justify the use of race in university admissions.135
Justice O’Connor essentially ignored Brown, too. Her lone
reference to Brown was this: “This Court has long recognized that
‘education . . . is the very foundation of good citizenship.’ For this
reason, the diffusion of knowledge and opportunity through public
institutions of higher education must be accessible to all individuals
regardless of race or ethnicity.”136 One of many ironies surrounding
Justice O’Connor’s decision is that, had her ultimate decision in
Grutter remained true to the language she chose to quote from
Brown, she would have remained faithful to Brown’s fundamental
principle. But, as she did throughout her opinion in Grutter, she
ignored it. And, in the process, she denied the petitioner’s right to
equal access to this “knowledge and opportunity . . . regardless of
[her] race.”137 It was an outcome that flies in the face of everything
the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI, and Brown’s fundamental
principle stand for. Moreover, it was an outcome that flies in the face
of arguably everything of substance Justice Powell wrote in Bakke.
As Justice O’Connor later describes it, “[t]he Law school has
determined, based on its experience and expertise, that a ‘critical
mass’ of underrepresented minorities is necessary to further its
compelling interest in securing the education benefits of a diverse
student body.”138 Of course, this is akin to the very sort of policy
condemned by Justice Powell in unequivocal language:

133. Id.
134. It is important to note that absolutely no claim of individual victimization
by any preferred minority applicant due to present or past racial discrimination was
required to qualify for the racial preference to be applicable. Indeed, much like
UT’s concession in Fisher II, even affluent and educationally-privileged
underrepresented minority applicants to the University of Michigan were
considered under the race-conscious admission program while poor, disadvantaged
white and Asian applicants (no matter how highly qualified they may have been)
were racially ineligible to compete for the seats devoted to achieving a “critical mass”
of underrepresented minority students. Id. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(describing race as outcome determinative as to these seats). Race, and only race, was
considered when it came to enrolling a “critical mass” of these latter students. See id.
135. Id. at 325.
136. Id. at 331 (citing Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 333.
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If [UC-Davis]’s purpose is to assure within its student body
some specified percentage [read: critical mass] of a
particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin,
such a preferential purpose must be rejected not as
insubstantial but as facially invalid. Preferring members of
any one group for no reason other than race . . . is
discrimination for its own sake. This the Constitution
forbids.139
Simply saying that an institution is “preferring members of one
group” to accomplish a non-remedial goal, such as the achievement of
illusory and vague “educational benefits,” does not (or should not)
protect the policy against the plain meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Title VI, and Brown’s fundamental principle.140 Yet
Grutter and Fisher II each endorse precisely such an unconstitutional
outcome.
Central to understanding the harm Grutter inflicted on Brown is
the need to examine the shifting rationales employed by Justice
Kennedy, first in his dissent in Grutter, and later, as the author of the
Court’s opinion in Fisher II.141 We begin with Justice Kennedy’s
vigorous dissent in Grutter. Despite his expressed willingness to
recognize the interest being invoked by the law school,142 virtually no
justice was more strongly opposed to the outcome in Grutter than
Justice Kennedy. In addition to his concern over the fundamental
unfairness and divisiveness of race-conscious policies,143 his legal
concern was that the Grutter majority fundamentally misunderstood
the real meaning of Justice Powell’s “diversity rationale.”144 Justice
Kennedy commenced his dissent with this:
The separate opinion by Justice Powell in [Bakke] is based
on the principle that a university admissions program may
take account of race as one, non-predominant factor145 in

139. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978).
140. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 298.
141. See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387–90 (2003); Fisher II, 136
S. Ct. 2198, 2205–15 (2016).
142. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 395 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“I reiterate my approval
of giving appropriate consideration to race in this one context . . . .”).
143. Id. at 388 (“Preferment by race, when resorted to by the State, can be the
most divisive of all policies, containing within it the potential to destroy confidence
in the Constitution and in the idea of equality.”).
144. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 321.
145. Interestingly, neither Justice Kennedy, Justice O’Connor, nor Justice
Powell in Bakke for that matter, explain how race can be used as a factor in
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a system designed to consider each applicant as an
individual, provided the program can meet the test of strict
scrutiny by the judiciary. This is a unitary formulation.”146
He goes on to observe that “[h]aving approved the use of race as a
factor in the admissions process, the majority proceed[ed] to nullify
the essential safeguard Justice Powell insisted upon as the
precondition of the approval.”147
However, perhaps Justice Kennedy’s most critical point
consisted of how the law school implemented its admissions process,
as “the concept of critical mass [was] a delusion used by the Law School
to mask its attempt to make race an automatic factor in most
instances and to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from quotas.”148
Justice O’Connor’s bizarre dismissal of Justice Kennedy’s (and Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s) interpretation of “critical mass” as a masked
quota149 also contravened not only the factual determination made
by the trial court,150 but common sense as well.151

admissions and remain a non-predominant factor and/or can be “weighed fairly
and competitively.” Id. at 318. These are statements that make little sense. Every
explicit factor considered (be it an applicant’s race, her standardized test scores,
undergraduate grade point average, extra-curricular activities, or even her legacy
or state resident status) has the potential, at some point, to be
“outcome-determinative” in a particular admissions decision. Thus, whenever race
plays such a role, it is a direct violation of the guarantees provided to the individual
by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Prelude, supra
note 7, at 324 n.58. That race was sometimes “outcome determinative” under the
law school’s policy was admitted by University officials during trial. Grutter, 539 U.S.
at 324; see Trial Testimony of Michigan Law School Dean Jeffrey Lehman at 191–92
(Jan. 22, 2001), Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)) (on file with author).
Such an outcome contravenes virtually every word Justice Powell wrote in Bakke,
including this: “The denial to respondent of this right to individualized consideration
without regard to his race is the principal evil of petitioner’s special admissions
program.” Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318 n.52 (emphasis added).
146. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 388.
148. Id. at 389 (emphasis added). Justice Kennedy proceeds thereafter “to point
out how critical mass becomes inconsistent with individual consideration.” Id.
149. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335–36 (Justice O’Connor’s declaration that “critical
mass” was not a euphemism used by the law school to mask a quota).
150. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 842, 851 (E.D. Mich. 2001);
Prelude, supra note 7, at 330–31.
151. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 332–33 (1974). In a situation
indistinguishable from the arguments made by the Michigan Law School in Grutter,
Justice Douglas noted in DeFunis that although “a precise number of places were not
set aside” and”[w]ithout becoming embroiled in a semantic debate over whether
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Justice Kennedy continued in dissent with another commonsense observation: “The Law School has not demonstrated how
individual consideration is, or can be, preserved at this stage of the
application process given the instruction to attain what it calls critical
mass.”152 And, of course, it cannot be done. Justice Kennedy then
appropriately quoted Justice Powell from Bakke: “Whether the
objective of critical mass ‘is described as a quota or a goal, it is a line
drawn on the basis of race and ethnic status,’ and so risks
compromising individual assessment.”153
Justice Kennedy’s criticism of the law school’s cynical use of
“critical mass” was unrelenting.154 But he also recognized the equally
cynical use of the diversity rationale itself, observing that “[m]any
academics at other law schools who are ‘affirmative action’s’ more
forthright defenders readily concede that diversity is merely the current
rationale of convenience for a policy they prefer to justify on other
grounds.”155
Notwithstanding his strongly-worded criticisms of the Law
School’s program and its use of the phrase “critical mass” to disguise
its desire to enroll a certain number of students solely based on their
race, thirteen years later Justice Kennedy capitulated and endorsed
an identical scheme in Fisher II.156
Before reaching Fisher, however, it is important to briefly review
two other cases, the first of which was decided in 2007157 during the
interlude between Grutter and Fisher; the second came down in

this practice constitutes a ‘quota,’ it is clear that, given the limitation on the total
number of applicants who could be accepted, this policy . . . reduce[d] the total
number of places for which DeFunis could compete solely on account of his race.”
Id. There is no substantive difference between the situation in DeFunis, and the
situation in Grutter, where the law school’s goal of enrolling a “critical mass” of
underrepresented minority students meant that the seats necessary to achieve
“critical mass” were not open to competition by white and Asian-American
applicants. See Prelude, supra note 7, at 321, 328–31.
152. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 391 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289
(1978)).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 393 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Justice Thomas agreed,
characterizing the “diversity” rationale as little more than “a faddish slogan of the
cognoscenti.” Id. at 350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
156. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
157. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007).
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2014,158 a year after Fisher I. The first of the two cases, Parents Involved
In Community Schools v. Seattle, did not involve the use of race in
admissions in the context of higher education (it involved
elementary and high school programs in Washington and Kentucky,
respectively); but it was here, in this decision, where full-fledged
warfare broke out between the justices as to the meaning of Brown.159
8.

Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle160

This case is a consolidation of two cases involving school districts
that voluntarily adopted student assignment plans that relied upon
race to determine which public schools certain children may
attend.161 The legal issue was whether a public school may choose to
classify students by race and rely upon that classification in making
school assignments.162 These governmental uses of race were
challenged on the grounds that they violated petitioners’ rights
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.163 Both systems were struck down by the Court.164
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion, noting “that
our prior cases, in evaluating the use of racial classifications in the
school context, have recognized two interests that qualify as
compelling. The first is the compelling interest of remedying the
effects of past intentional discrimination . . . . The second . . . is the
interest in diversity in higher education upheld in Grutter.”165 The Chief
Justice, who was not a member of the Court when Grutter was
decided, was perhaps being overly deferential to its precedent; but
he made clear in his opinion that (Grutter notwithstanding) Brown
required public school districts “to achieve a system of determining
admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis.”166

158. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
159. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (including five separate opinions).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 702.
162. Id. at 701.
163. Id. at 714, 733.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 720–21 (2007) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
166. Id. at 705 (citing Brown I, 349 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1955)). The Chief Justice
also noted that “[r]acial balancing is not transformed from ‘patently
unconstitutional’ to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it ‘racial
diversity.’” Id. at 732.

540

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:2

At this point, the battle broke out as to “which side [was] more
faithful to the heritage of Brown.”167 In response, the Chief Justice
persuasively argued that “the position of the plaintiffs in Brown was
spelled out in their brief and could not have been clearer.”168 Among
the facts he cited were the words of counsel for the plaintiffs who,
without any equivocation, took the position that “no State has any
authority under the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to use race as a factor in affording education
opportunities among its citizens.”169After citing to Brown, the Chief
Justice concluded his opinion in Parents Involved with words that
perfectly mirror Brown’s fundamental principle: “The way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the
basis of race.”170
Unfortunately, the Court’s opinion in Parents Involved was
horribly splintered when it came to “Brown’s clear message.”171 With
all due respect, the problem with the dissenters’ position is that they
entirely ignored the arguments made by the plaintiffs in Brown, and
paid no attention whatsoever to the actual wording of the
“fundamental principle” which a unanimous Court in Brown
announced.172
Standing cautiously on the sidelines, however, was Justice
Kennedy. While he concurred in the result striking down “the statemandated racial classifications . . . [as] unconstitutional,” and
criticized Justice Breyer’s dissent as “a misuse and mistaken
interpretation of our precedents,”173 he needlessly lapsed into the
mantra that has become all too pronounced on the current Court:
that “race matters.”174 Justice Kennedy put it this way: “The enduring

167. Id. at 747.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 748.
171. Id. at 801 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted). Justice Stevens’ dissent must rank among the more impolite dissents in
Court history, with Justice Breyer’s among the least faithful to precedent.
172. See, e.g., Prelude, supra note 7, at 343–44 and accompanying notes; Grutter
(Not) Revisited, supra note 7, at 21–24.
173. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 782–83 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
174. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor variously adhere to the view that
“race matters.” See, e.g., Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct.
1623, 1651–83 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 803–
68 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 301–02 (2003)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Their positions closely track that of Justice Brennan in
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hope is that race should not matter; the reality is that too often it does.”175
At the same time, he asserted that “[t]o make race matter now so
that it might not matter later may entrench the very prejudices we
seek to overcome.”176 All of this points out his failure to, among other
things, distinguish between personal and private views not endorsed
by the state (which, for better or worse, are governed by the First
Amendment) and state-sanctioned conduct, the latter of which most
certainly is governed by the Equal Protection Clause as well as by
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.177
The problem which seems to elude each justice (including
Justice Kennedy) who invokes the “race matters” argument is this:
when our laws prohibiting racial discrimination are scrupulously
enforced by the courts, they establish a standard of conduct
expected from every citizen. Conversely, when they are not enforced,
or are disregarded (as in Grutter and Fisher II), it creates, as Justice
Kennedy once put it, “the potential to destroy confidence in the
Constitution and in the idea of equality.”178
In a similar vein, Justice Kennedy was also troublingly dismissive
of Justice Harlan’s “color-blind” assertion in Plessy.179 He
Bakke, who wrote, “claims that law must be ‘color-blind’ or that . . . race is no longer
relevant to public policy must be seen as aspiration rather than as . . . reality.”
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 327 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring
and dissenting in part). However, Justice Brennan’s observations were premised on
his view that “even today [in 1978] officially sanctioned discrimination is not a thing
of the past.” Id. In the author’s view, the prescription for ending “officially
sanctioned discrimination” wherever it exists is to vigorously enforce the guarantees
against racial discrimination as contained in the Equal Protection Clause and Title
VI, and as embodied in Brown’s fundamental principle.
175. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
176. Id. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
177. Many state constitutional provisions and statutes also prohibit
government-sanctioned racial preferences. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26 (2016).
Adopted by Michigan’s voters in 2006, in direct response to the outcome in Grutter,
this provision provides in relevant part that Michigan’s public universities “shall not
discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on
the basis of race . . . .” Id.
178. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 388 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
179. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy’s dismissal of Justice Harlan’s
memorable dissent in Plessy, which many today consider to be an expression of a
“universal constitutional principle,” is all the more ironic when one considers
Justice Kennedy once signed onto an opinion (along with Justice O’Connor and
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characterized it as an “axiom [that] must command our assent,” only
to conclude that, “[i]n the real world, it is regrettable to say, it cannot
be a universal constitutional principle.”180
But if Justice Kennedy is right, one is forced to ask of one of our
most senior and influential Supreme Court justices: “What, Your
Honor, constitutes a universal constitutional principle? And if
Brown’s ‘fundamental principle’ (which does nothing if not echo
Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy) is not ‘a universal constitutional
principle,’ then what principle is?”
9.

Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action181

Justice Kennedy’s evolution from a strong protector of each
person’s right to equal protection under the laws without regard to
race took another, albeit subtle, step backwards in 2014 in Schuette v.
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action.182 Schuette involved a direct
challenge to the University of Michigan’s race-conscious policies
approved in Grutter.183 At issue was the language of a Michigan state
constitutional amendment adopted by the voters in 2006, three years
after Grutter was decided.184 Among other things, it banned the use
of race in admissions to Michigan’s public universities.185 Although
Justice Kennedy wrote to uphold the right of a state’s citizens to
prohibit the use of racial preferences in public education (which, of
course, is fully consistent with Brown’s fundamental principle), his
opinion seemed to leave open the right of citizens to enact race
preferences, which is directly at odds with Brown.186 In addition, he
Justice David Souter) that referred to Plessy as “wrong the day it was decided.”
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992).
180. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
181. 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014)
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1628.
184. Id.
185. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26 (2016) (providing in relevant part that Michigan’s
public universities “shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment
to, any individual or group on the basis of race”). There are several states with
similar constitutional or state statutory law provisions to Michigan. See, e.g., ARIZ.
CONST. art. II, § 36; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a); NEB. CONST. art I, § 30; OKLA. CONST.
art. II, § 36; WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.400. All presumably are constitutional pursuant
to the Court’s decision in Schuette.
186. See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1635; see also R. Lawrence Purdy, “To Speak Openly
and Candidly on the Subject of Race” Musings on Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative
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included dicta that seemingly embraced the use of race to, among
other things, “transcend the stigma of past racism,”187 an argument
that would be even less exacting than the one firmly rejected by court
after court—remedying the “amorphous” effects of past societal
discrimination.188 While entirely unnecessary to the holding in
Schuette, it seemed to signal a permissible use of racial classifications
entirely at odds with Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke.189 If such a
finding ever were countenanced by Justice Kennedy, it would
contravene principles he had long extolled, at least up to and
including his dissent in Grutter.190
Whatever he had in mind with his puzzling observation, such a
suggestion seems nothing less than a rejection of Brown’s
fundamental principle, in effect treating Brown’s non-discrimination
dictate as little more than a polite suggestion rather than a
constitutional mandate. This brings us to Fisher.
10. Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (Fisher II)191
As has already been covered, this 2016 decision upholding UT’s
Grutter-like race-conscious admissions policy192 represents, at least as
of this writing, the Supreme Court’s complete nullification of
Brown’s fundamental principle. In Fisher II, Justice Kennedy turned
his back on every word he had written about an admissions system
that was modeled after and “indistinguishable” from the one he
railed against in Grutter.193
In 2003, he blistered the University of Michigan Law School’s
use of the term “critical mass,” a phrase both he and the late Chief
Action, et al., 12 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 508 (2016).
187. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1638.
188. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 307 (1978).
189. See id.
190. In a decision written by Justice Kennedy sixteen years prior to Fisher II, he
wrote: “One of the principal reasons race is treated as a forbidden classification is
that it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead
of by his or her own merit and essential qualities.” Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495,
543 (2000). There simply is no way to reconcile these words with the decision written
by this same justice in Fisher II.
191. 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
192. As the facts in Fisher II makes clear, the disputed Grutter-like portion of UT’s
policy affected approximately one-quarter of the entering class. The other
three-quarters were admitted pursuant to a facially race-neutral plan passed by the
Texas Legislature which took effect in 1998. Id.
193. See Prelude, supra note 7.
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Justice William Rehnquist accurately characterized as a “delusion
used by the Law School . . . to achieve numerical goals
indistinguishable from quotas.”194 Yet in 2016, UT’s equally cynical
misuse of “critical mass” was undeserving of so much as a cautionary
admonition from Justice Kennedy.195
In 2003, Justice Kennedy strongly criticized the Court in Grutter
for misapplying Justice Powell’s “unitary formulation” in Bakke
regarding how a university might “take account of race . . . in [an
admissions] system designed to consider each applicant as an
individual.”196 In 2016, with the exception of a single passing
parenthetical reference to the Fifth Circuit’s 2014 decision,197 Justice
Kennedy neglected to mention Justice Powell or Bakke in the
opinion.
In 2003, Justice Kennedy wrote in Grutter that “[t]o be
constitutional, a university’s compelling interest in a diverse student
body must be achieved by a system where individual assessment is
safeguarded through the entire process.”198 In 2016, there was not a single
word from Justice Kennedy reaffirming Abigail Fisher’s right to be
individually judged in accordance with her rights guaranteed by the
Equal Protection Clause, much less in accord with Brown’s
unambiguous fundamental principle.199 Instead, Justice Kennedy
surrenders her rights (and the rights of thousands of future UT
applicants) with a whimper, gratuitously noting that, “it remains an
enduring challenge to our Nation’s education system to reconcile the
pursuit of diversity with the constitutional promise of equal treatment and
dignity” (which he characterizes as a “sensitive balance” in the very
next sentence).200
The single-page dissent by Justice Clarence Thomas in Fisher II
neatly summarizes why Justice Kennedy’s decision is so
fundamentally wrong. After signaling his agreement with Justice
Samuel Alito’s detailed criticism of the final outcome, Justice
Thomas wrote:

194. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 389 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
195. The phrase “critical mass” appears only twice in the Court’s opinion,
without a single criticism of its use uttered by the opinion’s author. Fisher II, 136 S.
Ct. at 2210, 2211.
196. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
197. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016).
198. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 392 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
199. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
200. Id., 136 S. Ct. at 2214 (emphasis added).

2018]

AWAITING THE REBIRTH OF AN ICON

545

[T]he Court’s decision . . . is irreconcilable with strict
scrutiny, rests on pernicious assumptions about race, and
departs from many of our precedents. I write separately to
reaffirm that “a State’s use of race in higher education
admissions decisions is categorically prohibited by the
Equal Protection Clause.” “The Constitution abhors
classifications based on race because every time the
government places citizens on racial registers and makes
race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it
demeans us all.” That constitutional imperative does not
change in the face of a “faddish theor[y]” that racial
discrimination may produce “educational benefits.”201 The
Court was wrong to hold otherwise in Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). I would overrule Grutter and
reverse the Fifth Circuit’s judgment.202
Since his stinging dissent in Grutter, and as he eloquently
reaffirmed in Fisher I,203 Justice Thomas has never wavered in his
adherence to a “view of the Constitution [identical to] the one
advanced by the plaintiffs in Brown.”204 With nothing more to say on
the subject beyond the many pages he previously devoted in both
Grutter and Fisher I to the odious use of racial classifications, he left it
to Justice Alito to unwrap the details in Fisher. And unwrap them he
did.
At the outset of Justice Alito’s 51-page dissent, he provides an
outline that fairly captures the “inexplicabl[e]”205 nature of Justice
Kennedy’s opinion for the four-justice majority:
Something strange has happened since our prior decision in [Fisher
I]. In that decision, . . . we made it clear that UT was
obligated (1) to identify the interests justifying its plan with
enough specificity to permit a reviewing court to determine
whether the requirements of strict scrutiny were met, and
(2) to show that those requirements were in fact satisfied.
On remand, UT failed to do what our prior decision
demanded. [UT] has still not identified with any degree of
201. This is a direct reference to the non-remedial “compelling interest” first
recognized by the Court in Grutter. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
202. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2215 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
203. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Thomas, J., concurring).
204. See, e.g., id. at 2428 (“[N]o State has any authority under the
equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in
affording educational opportunities among its citizens.” (Thomas, J., concurring)).
205. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2215 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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specificity the interests that its use of race and ethnicity is
supposed to serve. Its primary argument is that merely invoking
“the educational benefits of diversity” is sufficient and that it need
not identify any metric that would allow a court to determine
whether its plan is needed to serve, or is actually serving, those
interests.206
Justice Alito’s first, and by far easiest, target was the ever-elusive
“critical mass.”207 Whatever one says about it, the fact is, UT “never
explained what this term means.”208 But as Justice Alito notes, “UT
tells us that it will let the courts know when the desired end has been
achieved.”209 Throughout his dissent, Justice Alito points out the
inconsistency between Fisher I and Fisher II, noting that “without
knowing in reasonably specific terms what critical mass is or how it
can be measured,” a court cannot perform “careful judicial inquiry”
into the importance of the use of race.210 After conducting a detailed
exposition of UT’s program, Justice Alito concludes that
“[c]onsideration of race therefore pervades every aspect of UT’s
admissions process.”211
Illustrating the irrational nature of Fisher II’s outcome is UT’s
bizarre claim that “it cannot provide even a single example . . . in
which [the use of its race-conscious admissions policy] impacted a
student’s odds of admission. . . . Accordingly, UT asserts that it has
no idea which students were admitted as a result of its race-conscious
system and which students would have been admitted under a raceneutral process.”212 UT’s claim, of course, begs the question: Why
utilize a race-conscious system if no method exists to determine its
206. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
207. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2216 (Alito, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 2216.
209. Id.; see id. at 2222 (“UT prefers a deliberately malleable ‘we’ll know it when
we see it’ notion of critical mass . . . In other words: Trust us.”). It is as if admissions
personnel at UT, like their forerunners at the University of Michigan Law School,
have created a cynical board game in which two cards, one labeled ”critical mass”
and the other labeled “the educational benefits of diversity,” are the ultimate wild
cards. If you draw both, you are free to violate the express language of the Equal
Protection Clause, Brown’s fundamental principle and Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 with impunity.
210. Id. at 2222; see also id. at 2216, 2219, 2222, 2224 (detailing Justice Alito’s
criticism of UT’s use of “critical mass”).
211. Id. at 2220.
212. Id. UT’s claim notwithstanding, the Court had no problem determining
that “race . . . can make a difference to whether an application is accepted or
rejected.” Id. at 2207.
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effectiveness in achieving a “critical mass” of minority students? And,
if UT is being honest in its assertion, how would any future court
determine under strict scrutiny analysis whether UT’s race-conscious
program is necessary to achieve its “critical mass” goal? If UT cannot
identify a single student for whom race made a difference in
admission, reviewing such a system and, more importantly, justifying
its continuation, become impossible. Under the best of
circumstances, UT’s position becomes a sort of “maybe we need to
use race, but maybe we don’t” argument. Nonetheless, this is
precisely the argument the majority in Fisher II countenanced.
IV. WHERE WE ARE NOW
In the roughly thirty-eight years since Bakke, and during the
thirteen years that elapsed between Grutter and Fisher II, what has
happened to Brown’s fundamental principle? Despite criticism of
Justice Powell’s views on the potential use of race to achieve
“diversity,” virtually every word of his lone dicta in Bakke was fully
consistent with Brown’s decree.213
Ironically, although Justices O’Connor and Kennedy purported
to be faithful to Justice Powell’s diversity rationale, neither Justice
O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter nor Justice Kennedy’s opinion in
Fisher II adhered to Bakke’s most important holdings. Indeed, the
opinions that most closely hew to Justice Powell’s enunciated
principles, particularly those regarding an applicant’s right to be
considered under a “facially nondiscriminatory admissions
policy,”214 are Justice Thomas’s and Justice Kennedy’s dissents in

213. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289–90 (1978) (“The
guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one
individual and something else when applied to a person of another color. If both
are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal.”).
214. Id. at 318; see id. at 318 n.52 (illuminating Justice Powell’s description that
such an admissions policy as a ”right [pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause] to individualized consideration without
regard to . . . race”).
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Grutter;215 Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Fisher I;216 and Justices
Thomas and Alito’s dissents in Fisher II.217
Given Justice Kennedy’s fickle devotion to the Equal Protection
Clause, and his entire rejection in Fisher II of Brown’s fundamental
principle,218 it is difficult to predict the latter’s impact in future cases
involving the use of race as a factor in admissions. Whether this
universal principle will ever be resurrected depends, of course, upon
the facts presented in the next case that inevitably will reach the
Court’s docket, and whether those who challenge these non-remedial,
race-conscious admissions systems are prepared to aggressively
challenge the “remarkably wrong”219 outcomes in both Grutter and
Fisher II.220
So here we sit, nearly sixty-four years after Brown announced
that
“racial
discrimination
in
public
education
is
unconstitutional,”221 with several decisions and a handful of
Supreme Court Justices categorically rejecting Brown’s bedrock
principle. And all it takes is a handful of justices to return us to the
very same “race matters” proposition that motivated the old-line
segregationists.222
215. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 362 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring and
dissenting in part); id. at 394 (Kennedy J., dissenting) (noting that the Court
violated Bakke by “suspend[ing]” the “basic protection put in place by Justice
Powell”).
216. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2424–29 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(eloquently setting forth Justice Thomas’ view of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
in particular how it perfectly meshes with Brown’s fundamental principle).
217. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2220–21 (2016) (demonstrating Justice Alito’s
adherence to Justice Powell’s view of the Equal Protection Clause, and quoting what
once-upon-a-time seemed to be the view of Justice Kennedy as “[t]he moral
imperative of racial neutrality is the driving force of the Equal Protection Clause”).
218. See id. at 2210 (noting that “a university may institute a race-conscious
admissions program as a means of obtaining ‘the educational benefits that flow from
student body diversity.’” (quoting Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419)).
219. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2243 (Alito, J., dissenting).
220. Note that petitioner’s counsel in Fisher (for reasons that remain
inexplicable to the author) chose not to challenge Grutter. See Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at
2422 (“The petitioner in this case did not ask us to overrule Grutter’s holding that a
‘compelling interest’ in the educational benefits of diversity can justify racial
preferences in university admissions.”) (Scalia, J., concurring).
221. Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955).
222. Justice Kennedy himself offered somewhat similar counsel over a decade
ago, stating, “[t]o make race matter now so that it might not matter later may
entrench the very prejudices we seek to overcome.” Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch.
v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 782 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
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V. CONCLUSION
The United States was born on the basis of an ideal that “all men
are created equal.”223 For all its rhetorical beauty, it was an ideal that
was placed for too long—in word and deed—beyond the grasp of
millions of enslaved men and women. The distinction that separated
the free from the unfree (and the “equal” from the “unequal”) was
simply the color of their skin. A bloody civil war was fought and the
emancipators prevailed. But the divisions based on race were not
washed away with their victory. The Thirteenth Amendment ended
slavery. It did not end racism. Nor, regrettably, did the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment.224
Almost a century after our civil war ended, President John F.
Kennedy reminded the American people that “race has no place in
American life or law.”225 While President Kennedy understood the
importance of passing legislation to outlaw racial discrimination, he
also understood that racial animosity itself was primarily a “moral
issue” and that “law alone cannot make men see right.”226 In the end,
no law can dictate what we think in our minds and feel in our hearts;
but the laws free men enact most certainly can dictate what our
government can, and cannot, do, and importantly—perhaps most
importantly—serve as a reflection of our noblest aspirations.
When it comes to the role a person’s race should play in our
system of public education, we have more than ample guidance. The
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is our
constitutional guide; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is our
statutory guide; and the “fundamental principle” adopted by a
and concurring in the judgment).
223. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
224. The question, in part, becomes whether any law can end racism that may
reside solely in the heart and mind of a truly free individual.
225. John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American People on
Civil
Rights
(June
11,
1963)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9271). Kennedy also said, “[Our
Nation] was founded on the principle that all men are created equal, and that the
rights of every man are diminished when the rights of one man are threatened.” Id.
Earlier that same year, Dr. Martin Luther King expressed a similar sentiment in his
famous April 16, 1963 “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” by writing, “Injustice
anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere . . . . Whatever affects one directly, affects
all indirectly.” Letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. entitled, “Letter from
Birmingham Jail” (Apr. 16, 1963) 1, https://liberalarts.utexas.edu/coretexts/_
files/resources/texts/1963_MLK_Letter_Abridged.pdf.
226. Kennedy, supra note 225.
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unanimous Supreme Court in Brown is our judicial North Star. The
perfectly symmetrical propositions contained within these three
sources provide the just answer to the issue raised in every case
discussed herein: “racial discrimination in public education is
unconstitutional.”227
In the end, Brown’s fundamental principle should govern every
aspect of our civic lives including, most importantly, our system of
public education. Achieving that goal, however, requires our highest
Court to faithfully reaffirm and uphold it. Surely the Court should
do that. The question is, will it?

227.

Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955).
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